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Abstract
We present Poseidon, a new anomaly based intru-
sion detection system. Poseidon is payload-based,
and presents a two-tier architecture: the first stage
consists of a Self-Organizing Map, while the second
one is a modified PAYL system [22]. Our bench-
marks on the 1999 DARPA data set [15] show a
higher detection rate and lower number of false pos-
itives than PAYL and PHAD.
1 Introduction
Intrusion detection systems were introduced by An-
derson [1] and formalized later by Denning [7].
Nowadays, there exist two main types of network
intrusion detection methods: anomaly based and
signature based. In signature based methods, (e.g.
Snort [21]) a characteristic trait of the intrusion
is developed off-line, and then loaded in the intru-
sion database before the system can begin to detect
this particular intrusion. This usually yields good
results in terms of low false positives, but has draw-
backs: first, all new attacks will go unnoticed until
the system is updated, creating a window of oppor-
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tunity for attackers to gain control of the system
under attack. Secondly, only known attacks can
be detected, and while this could be acceptable for
detecting attacks to e.g., the OS, it makes it much
harder to use signature-based system for protecting
web-based services, because of their ad-hoc nature.
Notably, the protection of web-services is becoming
a high-impact problem (see [10]).
Anomaly based systems (ABS), on the other
hand, build statistical models that describe the nor-
mal behaviour of the network, and flag any be-
haviour that significantly deviates from the norm
as an attack. This has the advantage that new at-
tacks will be detected as soon as they take place
(or – depending on the architecture – as soon as
the attack has taken place). Moreover, ABS can
be more easily applied also to ad-hoc networked
systems such as web-based services. The disadvan-
tage is that ABS needs an extensive model building
phase: a significant amount of data (and thus a sig-
nificant period of time) is needed to build accurate
models of legal behaviour.
Most intrusion detections systems in use today
are signature based, however, new attacks are de-
vised with increasing frequency every day (see [10]
for weekly and monthly single attack rates), so
anomaly based systems become increasingly attrac-
tive.
Every intrusion detection system suffers from (1)
false positives (false alarms), in which legal be-
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haviour is incorrectly flagged as an attack and (2)
false negatives, or misses, in which true attacks are
undetected. Anomaly based systems are more vul-
nerable to these problems than signature based sys-
tems because they use statistical models to detect
intrusions.
ABS can extract information to detect attacks
from different layers: packet headers, packet pay-
load or both. Header information is mainly useful
to recognize attacks aiming at vulnerabilities of the
network stack implementation or probing the op-
erating system to identify active network services.
On the other hand, payload information is most
useful to identify attacks against vulnerable appli-
cations (since the connection that carries the at-
tack is established in a normal way) [22]. Without
pretending to be globally better that other types
of ABS, payload-based systems have importance of
their own, as they are particularly suitable for de-
tecting popular attacks such as those on the HTTP
protocol, and worms (see Wang and Stolfo [22] for
a discussion). Notably, PAYL and the system of
Kruegel et al. [13] are mainly payload-based, while
PHAD [16] is partly payload based.
Contribution In this paper we propose POSEI-
DON (Payl Over Som for Intrusion DetectiON): a
two-tier intrusion detection architecture. The first
tier consists of a self-organizing map (SOM), and is
used exclusively to classify payload data; the sec-
ond tier consists of a slight modification of the well-
known PAYL system [22] (see Figure 1).
POSEIDON is payload-based: it uses only des-
tination address and service port numbers to build
a profile for each port monitored, and it does not
consider other header features.
We have extensively benchmarked our system
wrt PAYL [22] (also by replicating PAYL’s exper-
iments) and PHAD [16] using the 1999 DARPA
benchmark [15]. PAYL and PHAD are the ref-
erence ABS based on payload analysis. On this
dataset, our experiments show:
• a higher detection rate and lower number of
false positives than PAYL and PHAD.
• a reduction on the number of profiles used wrt
PAYL. This has a positive influence on the run-
time efficiency of the system.
Incidentally, being payload-based, our system
takes into consideration only what Mahoney and
Chan [17] call the legitimate data of the 1999
DARPA data set, implying that we can legitimately
expect that the system in real life performs as well
as it does on the DARPA benchmark.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2
presents the internals of POSEIDON and of PAYL;
in Section 3 we describe benchmarking experi-
ments and compare obtained results with PAYL
and PHAD. In Section 4 we discuss other related
work. Finally, in Section 5 we draw our conclu-
sions and set the course for further developments.
In the appendix we report the pseudo-code of PO-
SEIDON.
2 Architecture
Intrusion detection system can be either packet ori-
ented or connection oriented. In the former archi-
tecture, every packet is analysed as soon as it ar-
rives, without trying to correlate it with previous
collected data. On the other hand, connection ori-
ented systems work either by (a) reassembling the
whole connection (commonly only from client to
server) - waiting until the connection is closed - to
analyse the connection payload, or (b) by gather-
ing statistics which consider, e.g., the amount of
bytes transmitted and received, the duration of the
connection, the protocol type and final connection
status.
POSEIDON, like most intrusion detection sys-
tems, is packet oriented. This architecture presents
two main advantages: firstly, POSEIDON can iden-
tify and block an attack while it is taking place (in-
trusion prevention); in connection-based systems
the attack is seen only after it has taken place.
Secondly, connection-based systems are computa-
tionally more expensive, in particular they require
a huge amount of memory resources to keep all
the segments to analyse. This makes connection-
based system more suitable for off-line analysis. On
the other hand, connection-based systems support
a finer-grained analysis.
Our starting point is the PAYL architecture. Our
algorithm receives as input a packet and classifies
the packet, without prejudice of any of its proper-
ties, such as length, destination port or application




Figure 1: PAYL and POSEIDON architectures
as much information as possible about packets (e.g.
high-dimensional data) for the anomaly detection
phase: we also want the classifier to operate in an
unsupervised manner. This is a typical clustering
problem which can be properly tackled using neu-
ral networks in general and Self-Organizing Maps
(SOM) [12] in particular. In fact, SOMs have been
widely used in the past both to classify network
data and to find anomalies. Here, we use them for
pre-processing.
In fact, our architecture combines a SOM with a
modified PAYL algorithm. Figure 1 shows a com-
parison between our architecture and PAYL’s.
We now give a high-level description of the al-
gorithms underlying our system, a more formal de-
scription is reported in the appendix. We first de-
scribe the SOM. Later in the section, we introduce
PAYL, focusing on the main differences between
our approach and the PAYL approach towards clas-
sification of network data.
2.1 SOM classification model
Self organizing maps are defined as topology-
preserving single-layer maps in which the topolog-
ical structure, imposed on the nodes in the net-
work, is not changed during classification (preserv-
ing neighbourhood relations) and there is only one
layer of nodes. A SOM is suitable to analyse high-
dimensional data and belongs to the category of
competitive learning networks [12]. Nodes are also
called neurons, to remind us of the artificial intelli-
gence nature of the algorithm. Each neuron n has
a vector of weights wn associated to it: the dimen-
sion of the weights arrays is equal to the length of
longest input data. These arrays (also referred as
reference vectors) determine the SOM behaviour.
To accomplish the classification, SOM goes
through three phases: initialization, training and
classification.
Initialization First of all, some system parame-
ters (nodes number, learning rate and radius) have
to be fixed by e.g. the IDS technician. The number
of nodes directly determines the classification given
by the SOM: a small network will classify different
data inputs in the same node while a large network
will produce a too sparse classification. Afterwards,
the array of node weights is initialized, usually with
random values (in the same range of input values).
Training The training phase consists of a num-
ber of iterations (also called epochs). At each iter-
ation one input vector x is processed as follows: x
is compared to all neuron weights arrays wn with
a distance function (Euclidean or Manhattan): the
most similar node (also called best matching unit,
BMU) is then identified.
After the BMU has been found, the neighbour-
ing neurons and the BMU itself are updated. The
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following update parameters are used: the neigh-
bourhood is governed by the radius parameter (r)
and the magnitude of the attraction is affected by
the learning rate (α).
During this phase, the map tends to con-
verge to a stationary distribution, which approx-
imates the probability density function of the high-
dimensional input data.
As the learning proceeds and new input vectors
are given to the map, the learning rate and radius
values gradually decrease to zero.
Classification During the classification phase,
the first part of the training phase is repeated for
each sample: the input data is compared to all the
weight arrays and the most similar neuron deter-
mines the classification of the sample (but weights
are not updated). The winning neuron is then re-
turned.
2.2 PAYL classification model
PAYL, is a n-gram [6] analysis algorithm, and
uses a classification method based on clustering of
packet payload data length.
PAYL classifies packets on the length of the pay-
load. During the training phase, for a given training
data set, PAYL computes a set of models Mij . For
each incoming packet, with destination port j and
payload length i, Mij stores incrementally the av-
erage byte frequency and the standard deviation of
each byte frequency. During the detection phase,
the same values are computed for incoming packets
and then compared to model values: a significant
difference from the norm produces an alert. To
compare models, PAYL uses a simplified version of
the Mahalanobis distance, which has the advantage
of taking into account not only the average value
but also its variance and the covariance of the vari-
ables measured.
The maximum amount of space required by
PAYL is: p ∗ l ∗ k, where p is the total number
of ports monitored (each host may have different
ports), l is the length of the longest payload and
k is a constant representing the space required to
keep the mean and the variance distribution values
for each payload byte (PAYL uses a fixed value of
512).
To reduce the otherwise large number of mod-
els to be computed, PAYL organizes models in
clusters. After comparing two neighbouring mod-
els using the Manhattan distance, if the distance
is smaller than a given threshold t, models are
merged: the means and variances are updated to
produce a new combined distribution. This process
is repeated until no more models can be merged.
Experiments with PAYL show [22] that a reduc-
tion in the number of model of up to a factor of 16
can be achieved.
Modification to PAYL Our modification to
PAYL works as follows: we pre-process each packet,
using the SOM. Afterwards PAYL uses the class
value given by the SOM (winning neuron) instead
of the payload length. Technically PAYL, instead
of using model Mij , uses the model Mnj where j
is the usual destination port and n is the classifica-
tion derived from the neural network. Then, mean
and variance values are computed as usual.
Having added SOM to the system we must allow
for both the SOM and PAYL to be trained sepa-
rately. Regarding resource consumption, we have
to revise the required amount of space to: p ∗n ∗ k,
where the new parameter n indicates the amount
of SOM network nodes.
3 Tuning and Experiments
In this section, we show the results of our bench-
marks and compare the performance of POSEI-
DON with PAYL and PHAD. PAYL and PHAD
are the two reference ADS based on payload. Un-
surprisingly, they are the only two ABS based on
payload which have published their detection rate
on the DARPA 1999 dataset.
3.1 SOM parameters tuning
The SOM algorithm needs several parameters on
start-up: the total number of network nodes, the
function used to compute the distance between vec-
tors and the values of the learning rate and update
radius. For the sake of transparency, we report here
the values used in our experiments.
Concerning the number of neurons, a small net-
work would yield a too course classification, while
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PAYL PAYL exp POSEIDON
Number of profiles used 4065 (11312 - unclustered) 1622
HTTP DR 89,00% 90,00% 100,00%FP 0,17% 0,73% 0,0016%
FTP DR 95,50% 94,74% 100,00%FP 1,23% 11,41% (1,21%∗) 11,31% (0,93%∗)
Telnet DR 54,17% 53,65% 95,12%FP 4,71% 4,94% 6,72%
SMTP DR 78,57% 73,34% 100,00%FP 3,08% 8,35% 3,69%
Overall DR with FP < 1% 58,8% (57/97) 73,2% (71/97)∗
Table 1: Comparison between PAYL, our implementation of PAYL (PAYL exp) and POSEIDON; DR
stands for detection rate, while FP is the false positive rate
a large network will produce a sparse classifica-
tion. In addition, it is worth bearing in mind
that the computational load increases quadratically
with the number neurons.
Experimenting with different initialization
parameters and using the quantization error
method [12] to evaluate the classification given
by the network, we found the best SOM with the
following parameters:
• Number of neurons: 96 (rectangular
network of 12 by 8).
• Learning rate: 0.1.
• Update radius: 4.
• Distance function: Manhattan.
3.2 Experiments
We have benchmarked POSEIDON against PAYL
(also by replicating the experiment on PAYL) and
PHAD, using the same data used by PAYL and
PHAD: the DARPA 1999 dataset [15]. This stan-
dard dataset is used as reference by a number of
researchers (e.g. [16, 19, 22]), and offers the possi-
bility of comparing the performance of various IDS.
This dataset has been criticized because of the en-
vironment in which data were collected [18]; as ex-
plained by Mahoney and Chan [17], it is possible to
tune an IDS in such a way that it scores particularly
well on this particular data set: some attributes –
specifically: remote client address, TTL, TCP op-
tions and TCP window size – have a small range
in the DARPA simulation, but have a large and
growing range in real traffic. IDS which take into
account the above-mentioned attributes are likely
to score much better on the DARPA set than in
real life. Since our system does not consider these
attributes, we can legitimately expect that the sys-
tem in real life performs as well as it does on the
DARPA benchmark.
To compare our model with PAYL, we apply the
same restrictions and conditions used by Wang and
Stolfo [22]: we focus only on inbound TCP packets,
with data payload, directed to hosts 172.016.0.0/16
and ports 1-1024.
We train the SOM clustering algorithm using in-
ternal network traffic of week 1 and week 3 (12
days, 2.444.591 packets, attack free): for each dif-
ferent protocol we use a different SOM. Then, we
use the same data to build PAYL models taking
advantage of the classification given by the neural
network.
After this double training phase, it is possible
to use the testing weeks (4 and 5) to benchmark
the intrusion detection algorithm. This data con-
tains several attack instances (97 payload-based at-
tacks are detectable applying the same traffic filter
mentioned above), as well as legal traffic, directed
against different hosts of the internal network: the
attack source can be situated both inside and out-
side the network.
Figure 2 shows a detailed comparison of PAYL
and POSEIDON in terms of percentage of true neg-
atives (reported on the y axis) wrt the percentage
false positives (x axis). Table 1 reports a summary
of these results: the first columns we have PAYL’s
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Figure 2: Detection rates for ports 21 (FTP), 23 (Telnet), 25 (SMTP) and 80 (HTTP): the x-axis and
y-axis present false positive rate and detection rate respectively. POSEIDON presents always a higher
detection rate compared with PAYL at the same false positive rate. For the graph relative to port 21
see Remark 3.2.
statistics as we have inferred them from the graph-
ics reported in Wang and Stolfo [22]. The second
column reports the figures we obtained by replicat-
ing Wang and Stolfo’s benchmarks. For the sake
of correctness, to replicate PAYL experiments we
used an un-clustered architecture, which yields on
one hand to a higher number of profiles, and on
the other hand to a better classification. The third
column reports POSEIDON’s result.
Remark During FTP protocol benchmarks we
found a high rate of false positives (more than
3000 packets) both with PAYL and with POSEI-
DON: all these packets are sent by the same source
host, which is sending FTP commands in a way
that is typical of the Telnet protocol (one character
per packet, with the TCP flag PUSH set). These
packets are marked as an attack because the train-
ing model does not contain this kind of traffic over
the FTP control channel port, although it is nor-
mal traffic. During our experiments with PAYL we
found the same behaviour: for this reason we de-
cided to present benchmarks results of PAYL and
POSEIDON also without taking into account these
packets (the figures with a star ∗ in Table 1 and the
graph in Figure 2).
Table 2 compares our results with PHAD: it is
not possible to make a full comparison between the
two systems, because of the restrictions used by
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PHAD authors (they restrict to a maximum total
amount of 100 false positives during 10 days of test-
ing). Nonetheless, we could legitimately compare
the two systems on the HTTP protocol, on which
POSEIDON meets the restrictions above.
Unfortunately, there is no other public available
data set suitable to compare our approach with
previous researches on anomaly intrusion detection:
many authors use the KDD 99 data set [2] in which
regrettably payload data is discarded. Because we
use payload information, we can not use this data
set to benchmark POSEIDON and models that use
this data set are not directly comparable with ours.
Concluding, we believe that the significant
achieved improvement over PAYL is determinated
by a better distribution of mean and variance value
within categories, obtained with introduction of a
new classification algorithm (SOM).
4 Related work
Intrusion detection systems based on anomaly de-
tection have been widely studied for two decades.
We recall that anomaly detection systems can op-
erate in various manners, sometimes extracting fea-
tures from packet headers and sometimes from pay-
load data.
In this section we report on related work. First
we describe other neural network-based systems
then we address statistical-based systems.
4.1 Neural networks based systems
We start by presenting other neural-network based
IDS. We cannot benchmark these systems wrt PO-
SEIDON because their authors use either private
data sets (Cannady [3], Labib and Vemuri [14] and
Ramadas et al. [20]), or data sets that do not con-
tain payload information (Depren et al. [8]) or do
not provide precise statistics (Nguyen [19]).
Cannady [3] proposes a SOM-based IDS in which
network packets are first classified according to nine
features and then presented to the neural network.
Attack traffic is generated using a security audit
tool. The author extends this work in Cannady [4,
5].
Nguyen [19] uses a one-tier architecture, consist-
ing of a SOM, to detect two attacks in the 1999
DARPA data set: the first one (mailbomb) against
the SMTP service, and the other one (guessftp)
against FTP.
Labib and Vemuri [14] use a SOM to identify De-
nial of Service attacks. They discard information
about payload and use only packet header informa-
tion; their data is collected from a private network
(described in a general way) and is not publicly
available.
Ramadas et al. [20] use a SOM to detect attacks
against DNS and HTTP services (using a private
data set): they use a pre-processor to summarize
some connection parameters (source and destina-
tion host and port) and then add several values
to track connections behaviour: the information is
then merged in a data structure used to fire events
related to the connection and to feed the neural
network.
Depren et al. [8] present a hybrid IDS based on
self-organizing maps and benchmark it on the KDD
99 data set [2]. They feed the neural networks (one
for each protocol type) with six features extracted
from each connection (duration, protocol type, ser-
vice type, status, total bytes sent and received)
and then use the quantization error method to de-
tect anomalies. The system is connection oriented,
therefore attacks can be detected only when the
connection is completely re-assembled. Regarding
their architecture, the authors state that the SOM
used to model TCP connections uses 1515 neurons;
which in our opinion is quite large, if compared with
the ones used by our system.
4.2 Statistical-based systems
In addition to ADS based on neural networks, there
exist ADS employing statistical models to detect
anomalous behaviour. We now report on them.
Again, we cannot benchmark them against POSEI-
DON because they either use only headers informa-
tion (Hoagland [9], Javitz and Valdes [11]) or em-
ploy benchmarking data that is not publicly avail-
able (Kruegel et al. [13]).
The SPADE [9], NIDES [11] and PHAD [16] sys-
tems rely on statistical models computed on nor-
mal network traffic: they work by extracting fea-
tures from the packet header fields and fire alarm
when they recognize a significant deviation from
the normal model; most of the features extracted
are related to IP addresses (source and destina-
tion), destination service port and TCP connection
7
Type Attack PHAD POSEIDON
Probe ntinfoscan 66,67% (2/3) 100% (3/3)
Denial of Service
apache2 100% (3/3) 100% (3/3)
back 0% (0/4) 100% (4/4)
crashiis 71,43% (5/7) 100% (7/7)
Remote to Local phf 66,67% (2/3) 100% (3/3)ppmacro 33,34% (1/3) 100% (3/3)
Overall detection rate 65% (13/20) 100% (20/20)
Table 2: Comparison between PHAD and POSEIDON detection rates.
state (PHAD uses up to 34 attributes coming from
Ethernet, IP and application layer protocols pack-
ets). Our approach differs from the one mentioned
here in the following aspects: (a) it is payload-
based: we use only destination address and ser-
vice port numbers to build a profile for each port
monitored, without taking care of other header fea-
tures (of the above systems only PHAD considers
payload information, we have compared it with our
system in the previous section). (b) We have a two-
tier architecture in which the SOM is used only to
pre-process information.
Shifting to payload-based systems, Kruegel et
al. [13] show that is is possible to find the descrip-
tion of a system that computes payload bytes dis-
tribution and combines this information with ex-
tracted packet header features: they first sort the
resultant ASCII characters by frequency and then
aggregate them into six groups. As argued in [22],
this leads to a very course classification of the pay-
load.
PAYL works in a way similar to Kruegel et al. [13]
but models the full byte distribution based on pay-
load data length and operates a clustering phase to
cover possible missing lengths. The PAYL archi-
tecture is made up of a single tier, while our archi-
tecture has two different layers: the first one, made
up by a SOM, is delegated to classify packets only
using payload data information, without using pay-
load length value. The second layer is a modified
version of PAYL that computes byte distribution
models using the classification information coming
from the first layer and extracting destination IP
address and service port from packets header.
5 Conclusion
We present an approach to Intrusion Detection
that involves the combination of two different tech-
niques: a self-organizing map and the PAYL archi-
tecture. We modify the original PAYL to take ad-
vantage of the unsupervised classification given by
the SOM, which then functions as pre-processing
stage.
Our experiments on the DARPA set show that
our approach reduces the number of profiles used by
PAYL (payload length can vary between 0 and 1460
in a Local Area Network, while the SOM neural
network used in our experiments has less than one
hundred nodes). In our experiments PAYL without
SOM required 3 times as many profiles as with the
SOM pre-processing (see Table 1).
We benchmark POSEIDON extensively against
the PAYL algorithm and data sets showing a higher
detection rate and lower false positives rate.
A Appendix: POSEIDON in-
ner functions
In this section we describe the inner mathematical
functions and algorithms used by POSEIDON.
A.1 SOM algorithm
DATA TYPE
RR = [0 .0 ..255 .0 ]
/* Reals (Double) between 0.0 and 255.0 */
l = length of the longest packet payload
PAYLOAD = array [1 ..l ] of [0 ..255 ]
DATA STRUCTURE
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N = non − empty finite set of neurons
for each n ∈ N let
wn := array [1 ..l ] of RR
/* array of weights associated */
/* to each neuron n */
α0 ∈ R /* Initial learning rate */
α := α0 /* Current learning rate */
r0 ∈ R /* Initial radius */
r := r0 /* Current radius */
τ ∈ N /* Number of training epochs */
k ∈ N /* Smoothing factor */
INIT PHASE
for each n ∈ N
for i := 1 to l
wn [i ] := random(RR)




for t := 1 to τ
/* Find winning neuron */
win dist := +∞
win neuron := n0
for each n ∈ N do
dist := manhattan dist(xt ,wn)
if (dist ≤ win dist) then
win dist := dist
win neuron := n
end if
done(for)
/* Process neighbouring neurons */
Nn = {n ∈ N | trig dist(n,win neuron) ≤ r}
for each nn ∈ Nn
for i := 1 to l
wnn [i ] := wnn [i ] + α ∗ (wnn [i ] − xt [i ])
α := α0 ∗ kk+t






win neuron ∈ N
win dist := +∞
dist := win dist
win neuron := n0
for each n ∈ N do
dist := manhattan dist(x ,wn)
if (dist < win dist) then
win dist := dist






feature vector = RECORD [
mean = array [1 ..256 ] of Real ,
/* average byte frequency */
stdDev = array [1 ..256 ] of Real
/* standard deviation of each */
/* byte frequency */
]
profile = RECORD [
p ∈ N, /* destination service port */
ip ∈ N, /* destination host address */
fv = finite set of n feature vectors
]
/* for each port monitored a profile */
/* with n feature vectors is associated */
DATA STRUCTURE
P = set of finite profiles
threshold ∈ R
/* numeric value used for anomaly */





n : SOM classification
ip : IP address ∈ N
sp : service port ∈ N
for each p ∈ P do
if (p.ip = ip and p.sp = sp) then
fv = p.getFV (n)
/* get feature vector with index n */
fv .update(x )






n : SOM classification
ip : IP address ∈ N
sp : service port ∈ N
OUTPUT:
isAnomalous : BOOLEAN
/* is the packet anomalous ? */
dist := +∞
isAnomalous := FALSE
for each p ∈ P do
if (p.ip = ip and p.sp = sp) then
fv := p.getFV (n)
/* get feature vector with index n */
dist := fv .getDistance(x )
/* get the distance between input */
/* data and associated profile */
end if
done(for)
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